Farisco, M., & Evers, K. (Eds.). (2016). Neurotechnology
and direct brain communication: New insights and responsibilities
concerning speechless but communicative subjects. Routledge.
Part 1 was here, with the introduction and first chapter.
Now reading chapter 2:
Demetriou, A., Spanoudis, G., & Shayer, M. (2016). Mapping mind-brain development. In Farisco, M., & Evers, K. (Eds.) Neurotechnology
and Direct Brain Communication: New insights and responsibilities
concerning speechless but communicative subjects, 21-39.
The chapter starts off with a theory
for how the mind is set up. (It's a theory I've seen before.) Thought
is broadly considered as categorical, spatial, quantitative, causal,
or social. Our perceptual systems are generally set up in ways that
support these kinds of thought and connection-making. There's the
idea that abstraction notes similarities between things, alignment
actually sticks stuff together by those similarities, and then
cognizance stores the stuck together stuff as its own thing. It seems
like a reasonable way of thinking about how stuff works. Then they start talking about how it
develops, with episodic representation, then mental representation, then rule-based representation, and then principle-based representation.
And I'm pretty sure they're talking about how everything develops
in neurotypical people,
though they don't specify that. I think it would be better if people
talking about neurotypical psychology and neurology explicitly said
they were doing so, rather than just saying they were talking about
people. For example, there's discussion of visual circuits, and
aphantasiacs don't do the visual things the same way y'all
think people do visual stuff. And kind of like language development people tend to assume we start at one word and build up, while some people start at phrases and break down, then remix, then build up on occasions where remixing isn't enough.
Or there's two main circuits that do
verbal working memory type things, one for rehearsal (getting ready
to say a thing, I guess) and one for “nonarticulatory maintenance
of phonological information” (p. 29). What does this mean for AAC
users? Or even neurotypicals on social media or otherwise using typed
language for real-time communication? What does this mean for the
students in my online classroom at AoPS? (And
no, I can neither assume that my students are neurotypical nor can I
assume that they're neurodivergent. I have no idea.) I wish I knew
what their citation was for these two verbal working memory networks.
Rehearsal is supposed to be left-lateralized (in righties or in
everyone? They didn't say!) premotor-parietal, for which it would
make sense to me that we'd just get premotor areas related to
whatever body part is being used to communicate instead of related to
the mouth, but use a similar circuit regardless of communication
medium. Verbal maintenance is supposed to be bilateral,
anterior-prefrontal to inferior parietal.
I
wonder how the rehearsal areas might activate when using, say, a P300
speller. Would activation depend on whether the current stimulus is
for the desired letter or not? How does the slower speed of typing
affect the activation of and demands on working memory? Is this even
the most relevant working memory circuit for P300 use? (I know
working memory is relevant, but it could
be a visual working memory circuit we need to care about, or one of
the verbal ones, or all the parts that are in either, or only the
parts that are in both. I dunno!)
Oh,
come on, now we get to
see theory of mind come up, where a mentalizing network is suggested
to be needed to serve awareness of mental states, and that this (with
alerting and orienting attention?) is key to consciousness. If I
never see theory of mind theory again, it will be too soon. (I say
shortly after turning in revisions to a chapter that examined the
effects of of theory of mind on interpretation of autistic
autobiographical narratives, which required me to deal with quite a
bit of theory of mind nonsense. Why do I do this to myself?) There's apparently been research into the neuroanatomical (phrenological?) and neurochemical bases of this theory of mind thing, too. Because they cite
Abu-Akel, A., & Shamay-Tsoory, S. (2011). Neuroanatomical and neurochemical bases of theory of mind. Neuropsychologia, 49(11), 2971-2984.
Which is apparently a well-cited article, per my looking it up. Why.
How is
it “obvious” that mentalizing ability and executive control would
be served by the same systems? Is it only obvious that these use the
same systems in neurotypicals? Or is it therefore paradoxical to be
decent at guessing how others would feel in a given situation, while
also having pretty terrible executive functioning. Am I a paradox? I
think it'd be interesting to be a paradox.
If
salience/shifting networks are already in place in some form before
birth, like Hoff et al seems to suggest, and salience networks
function differently between autistic people and neurotypical people,
is this one of the places we can point to neurodevelopmental
differences even before birth? (I'm kind of betting it is, even if
it's not one we've checked yet. There are a lot of things we don't
know yet about brain networks.) Hoff et al is:
Hoff, G. E., Van Den Heuvel, M.,
Benders, M. J., Kersbergen, K. J., & de Vries, L. S. (2013). On development of functional brain connectivity in the young brain. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 7, 650.
I run into an autism/connectivity paper on the first page when trying to find Hoff, so bookmarking that too:
Belmonte, M. K., Allen, G.,
Beckel-Mitchener, A., Boulanger, L. M., Carper, R. A., & Webb, S. J.
(2004). Autism and abnormal development of brain connectivity. Journal of Neuroscience, 24(42), 9228-9231.
The introduction of that paper already annoys me with the prevention/remediation nonsense, though I appreciate how it called autism research disconnected. I kind of already knew that whenever I deal with autism-related literature, I need to grab what useful bits I can while wading through messes.
Or even the ages of transitions between levels of abstraction in thought. There's some range in typical development, but that doesn't mean that neurodivergent people will fall inside those ranges. (And we may well build up the ability to do things at one level that y'all wouldn't have, because the "next" level grants it easily and you get there by the time you need it.)
Oh, and while we can point to networks that are active in certain functions, there's no cognitive functions whose corresponding networks are totally known, even in the totally neurotypical. No, I don't think I run all the same networks for everything that a neurotypical person does. There's already some autism-related evidence that I don't, and there's starting to be some aphantasia-related evidence that I don't, too. Please, please specify when you're talking about neurotypical networks and structures.
Part 3 is/will be here.